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In this essay, we apply insights from International Economics and Economic Geography to examine how the
current COVID-19 crisis may structurally change the international economy. Our key argument is that the current
crisis will fundamentally change key economic actors’ risk appetite, triggering a renewed risk assessment that will
lead to the comeback of buffers and borders across industries. This partial return to regionalization will involve a
form of de-globalization that transforms modern just-in-time management into its just-in-case counterpart,
because resilience will be priced and discounted for by enterprises and governments alike. We discuss what such a
structural change will imply for the International Business of international value chains.1. Introduction: the immediate economic impact
The COVID-19 virus took the world by surprise. After it became clear
that the virus is far more serious than ‘just a flu’, many countries went
into lockdown in March 2020 in order to try to contain the spread of the
virus. The economic impact of the lockdown has already been enormous
by the time of writing this essay (late May 2020). The International
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2020), for instance, predicts that despite massive
government support the GDP in the advanced economies will contract by
6% in 2020, and that almost every country on the globe will face a severe
economic recession. World trade volumes will contract by more than
10%, and theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) – in a worst-case scenario
– is predicting a more than 30% decline in world trade, which is more
than the Great Trade Collapse in the wake of the financial crisis in
2008–2009, as Fig. 1 illustrates.
These estimates about the impact of the corona crisis on the global
economy depend in no small part on the (unknown) length of the lock-
down: The longer it takes, the more pessimistic the – very uncertain –
predictions are. Although it is still early days, the COVID-19 economic
shock is already unprecedented in modern history (see Box 1 for other
pandemics). With the very limited knowledge of today, the immediate or
short-run economic impact can only be compared with the economic
depression of the 1930s. Given the very large degree of uncertaintyconomics, Vrije Universiteit Ams
an Witteloostuijn).
vier Ltd. This is an open access asurrounding the COVID-19 shock, both from a health and economic
perspective, it is clear that a large part of the economic contraction will
precisely be the direct result of the heightened uncertainty and its impact
on production and spending plans (Baker, Bloom, Davis, & Terry, 2020).
The IMF is, however, relatively optimistic about a world-wide economic
recovery in 2021, but it also strongly emphasizes that this optimism
crucially depends on the assumption of the pandemic fading away during
2020, and that the containment policies that many countries took will be
scaled back by the end of 2020. Current government policies, such as
income support, tax holidays, and rent support, aim at preventing people
from becoming unemployed and companies from going bust. If the pol-
icies are successful and the pandemic is indeed fading, one can be rela-
tively optimistic about the economic circumstances in 2021 in the sense
that growth rates will bounce back, and will be positive.
However, all this is highly uncertain, as all this crucially depends
upon finding an effective and scalable vaccine or medicine on relatively
short notice. Although the world is investing in a rat race to do so,
earlier virus vaccine and medicine routes have proven that such a
speedy solution is anything but guaranteed. More often than not, after
all, the vaccine discovery process takes a few years or even decades
(e.g., a vaccine for hiv is still to be developed). This would imply that
COVID-19 will circulate for much longer, causing further economic
damage. In addition, being a new virus about which much is stillterdam, the Netherlands.
rticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. World merchandise trade volume, 2000–2022 (index, 2015 ¼ 100)
Source: WTO (2020), Press Release (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm).
Box 1
Pandemics
Pandemics have occurred frequently in human history. The interaction of regional disease pools, through wars or commercial contacts, exposed
inhabitants to unknown infectious diseases. Some of the most well-known pandemics are (type of disease, year, and estimated number of ca-
sualties between brackets):
Antonine Plague (small-pox, 165–180, 5M).
Plague of Justinian (Yersinia Pestis Bacteria, 541-2, 30–50M).
Black Death (Yersinia Pestis Bacteria, 1347–1351, 200M).
Great Plague of London (Yersinia Pestis Bacteria, 1665, 100.000).
Italian Plague (Yersinia Pestis Bacteria, 1629–1631, 1M).
Third Plague-China/India (Yersinia Pestis Bacteria, 1885, 12M).
Spanish Flu (H1N1 virus, 1918-19, 50–100M).
Asian flu (H2N2, 1957-58, 1.1M).
Avian flu (H1N1, 2009, 200.000).
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-Corona, 2002-3, 774).
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-Corona, 2015-present, 850).
Ebola Virus Disease (Ebolavirus, 2014-16, 11.000).
COVID-19 (Corona, 2019-present, 300.000 and rising).
Source: Scheidel (2017), chapter 11.
S. Brakman et al. Social Sciences & Humanities Open 2 (2020) 100034unknown, the virus may mutate into an even more aggressive and
deadly variant. Another uncertainty relates to the response of societies
to such prolonged virus circulation. Will they periodically return to a
lockdown regime to limit the death toll and to avoid incinerating the
health system? Alternatively, will the economic damage of lockdown
policies be considered so disproportional that next outbreaks of COVID-
19 will be met with (much) less strict responses? All these unanswered2
questions indicate that the world must navigate through times full of
fundamental uncertainty, which is quite different from calculable risk.
From a large literature in Economics, we know that responses and
consequences of such fundamental uncertainty will be very different
from those associated with calculable risk (Keynes, 1936; Knight, 1921;
van Witteloostuijn, 1990). In this essay, we will think through a few of
these responses and consequences, emphasizing issues highly relevant
S. Brakman et al. Social Sciences & Humanities Open 2 (2020) 100034from an International Business (IB) perspective: the role of borders and
buffers.
Our essay is structured as follows. In the next section, we will turn
away from guessing the economic impact of COVID-19 in terms of GDP or
employment for the world economy. It is certain that this impact will be
very substantial. Once the dust has settled in terms of the negative eco-
nomic impact, the question remains whether and how the COVID-19
shock will lead to structural changes in the economy. How will eco-
nomic agents internalize the COVID-19 experience? Will the economy
simply return to business-as-usual, or will pre-corona routine behavior be
re-evaluated? In the next section, we will argue that, in general terms,
COVID-19 will most likely have a long-lasting impact. In our view, it will
lead to a structural and persistent overall increase in uncertainty
awareness. More uncertainty awareness will play out along two di-
mensions: (1) many economic agents will maintain more buffers; and (2)
national borders will become more important (or, one might argue, both
will make a comeback). Economic agents will, rightly or wrongly, use
buffers and borders to increase their resilience to shocks like COVID-19,
and the most salient feature of modern globalization, international just-
in-time production and delivery, will be adjusted, and transformed into
just-in-case management. So, we will thus argue that globalization in
times of corona will structurally change the prevailing view on the
relevance of borders and buffers.
Hence, this essay outlines what COVID-19 might entail for global-
ization. We do so through the lens of (International and Spatial) Eco-
nomics and (Economic) Geography, to identify issues we believe are
highly relevant from the perspective of International Business (IB). We
offer no new empirical evidence, nor do we develop novel theories; we
just provide some food for thought as to how the world economy might
change, and what this may imply for an IB research agenda. In doing so,
we are very much aware of the fact that we have to focus the discussion,
and hence highlight a limited number of topics. This implies that we have
to skip altogether or only briefly refer to topics such as the implications of
COVID-19 for global income inequality, the nature of work, hidden un-
employment, changing management practices, the labor market,
ecological sustainability, migration, foreign direct investment (FDI) or
the impact on inner cities, to name just a few other issues, out of many.
We will leave that to our fellow researchers (see, for example, Baldwin
and di Mauro, 2020). One thing is certain: amidst all the fundamental
uncertainty that inevitably surrounds the discussions on the economic
impact of COVID-19, we can be certain that this is a crisis that will be
with us for a long time to come, as will the virus itself.
2. Structural changes ahead? The return of borders and buffers
Given the fact that COVID-19 is an unprecedented shock to the world
economy and that the shock is still unfolding, the question naturally
arises whether the pandemic might have long-lasting effects on the way
we are doing business internationally and the way organizations and
economies as a whole are organized. Will COVID-19, besides triggering a
severe negative global business cycle, lead to structural changes in the
organization of the international economy? The virus has exposed vul-
nerabilities in the global economic system that were hidden to many,
until recently. For instance, essential medical supplies were insufficiently
available locally, which reveals that many countries have become
dependent on long international supply chains, with a small disruption
somewhere along a supply chain being felt everywhere. The Peterson
Institute for International Economics (PIIE, 2020) notes that China, as
one of the main suppliers of medical supplies, has redirected
Chinese-made supplies from exports to domestic usage. As a conse-
quence, global prices for medical supplies increased substantially, as did
global shortages. Experiences like these might change future interna-
tional relations. Governments are confronted with unpleasant interna-
tional dependencies and vulnerabilities. Becoming too dependent on
global supply chains might lead to a re-evaluation of global trade and risk
assessments.3
When it comes to structural changes to the international economy
that might occur in the wake of the current COVID-19 crisis, our take is
that the days of modern globalization as we have known it for the last 30
odd years are over. The world was already witnessing an increasing
resentment against modern globalization, as is clear from Brexit and the
Trumpian China-US trade war, but this resentment has now gained even
more momentum. In this respect, The Economist notes that the “under-
lying anarchy of global governance is being exposed” (The Economist,
March 14, 2020, “Has COVID killed Globalization?”). The most likely
consequence is that the increase of international trade and FDI, the rise of
global vertical specialization, fueled by technological change, and the
dominance of emerging economies like Chinawill be re-evaluated. We do
not suggest or predict the end of globalization, as the benefits of the
global division of labor are unambiguously positive, but merely that
national governments, business firms and also end consumers will re-
assess the current form and phase of globalization by applying a
different risk assessment or expressing a different risk appetite. After all,
all need to navigate their way in a new world featuring fundamental
uncertainty.
Both at the macro andmicro-economic level, economic agents need to
become more resilient to unforeseen shocks such as an unexpected trade
war or another pandemic outbreak. From the perspective of the inter-
national economy, there are at least two main avenues of change in the
‘post-corona’world that we would like to emphasize here, as to how risks
will be re-assessed and managed differently such that resilience will be
increased. The first avenue involves the reconsideration of the ‘lean-and-
mean’ notion of efficiency that has spurred globalization and the global
international division of labor since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as
the arrival of countries such as China and India on the world economic
stage. In all likelihood, this notion will be dropped for a new concept of
efficiency where buffers, security of production lines, and delivery gua-
rantees will gain prominence. Or, as the Financial Times (2020) states:
“goodbye ‘just in time’management, hello ‘just in case’management.” In
a nutshell, this implies a return of stock buffers in value chains to make
them more shock proof. Partly, this comeback will be initiated by (large)
enterprises that are not willing to accept the risk to have their delivery
chain being radically disrupted again. Moreover, this will be forced upon
the business world by national governments that demand local supply in
what they see as vital sectors.
The second avenue through which we think that the current COVID-
19 crisis will have a lasting impact on the international economy is via
the increased importance of international borders. Borders will make a
comeback for two reasons. First, the mere fact that distance will be an
increased liability in post-corona times implies that firms, consumers,
and governments will put more value on local or near-by production and
access to (particularly vital) products and services. Global supply chains
will not only be diversified, but will also be regionalized (Seric & Win-
kler, 2020). This is not a return, as in the 1930s, to a more autarkic na-
tional economy, but a higher distance awareness resulting in further
regionalization. The European Union (EU) and the United States (US),
say, will no longer accept full dependability on far-away suppliers of vital
products and services. Currently, many value chains are critically
dependent upon shackles in the chain that have been (close to fully)
monopolized by production in China or India. In addition, borders might
become more relevant again for the simple fact that national govern-
ments (and their citizens) will structurally re-assess the risks associated
with the international or cross-border flows of people and goods (Bald-
win & Evenett, 2020).
The goal of this large-scale risk re-assessment along the buffer and
border dimensions is to increase economic resilience, of both enterprises
and societies. National governments strive to be better able to adapt to
and protect their economies and citizens against shocks like COVID-19,
firms and their workers also will try to create more leeway to deal with
a potential future shock, and consumers, too, will re-assess behaviors and
decisions along these two dimensions. For the state of globalization as it
existed prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the renewed
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hand, the international economy will become less global and more
regional. This does not mean a decrease of international trade or capital
flows per se, but rather involves an increased penalty of distance, which
favors (further) economic integration with nearby countries. In addition,
the experience of the lockdown creates an increased awareness that
working at a distance is possible in production domains that traditionally
were carried out in the same office building. The link between the office
and the employee is cut by the lockdown, but why stop at the border?
Increased international fragmentation can be expected, especially in
services.
Finally, we should emphasize that a risk re-assessment through more
attention to buffers and borders is only a means to an end; the aim is
improved resilience. Until now, performance in our globalized economy,
both for countries and firms and their workers alike, is primarily
measured in terms of economic growth in GDP, productivity or income,
respectively (see also Fig. 1). This, as we have experienced in the COVID-
19 crisis, is too one-dimensional. After all, increased resilience does not
necessarily coincide with increased growth of GDP, productivity and/or
income. Resilience requires costly investment, preparation, and mainte-
nance, with the benefit being less immediate and less salient. Resilience
has to with the ability to initially resist or withstand, and to subsequently
recover from or adapt to shocks (Brakman, Garretsen, & van Marrewijk,
2015; Fingleton, Garretsen, & Martin, 2012; Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis,
Martin, & Rentfrow, 2020). Whether improved resilience (always) co-
incides with increased growth of GDP/productivity/income performance
is far from obvious. Instead of maximizing or optimizing any growth
(GDP, productivity, income or otherwise) trajectory as such, resilience
refers far more to the ability as an economic agent or entity in the face of
shocks to continue to steer as closely to that trajectory as possible,
whatever the growth path itself might be.
In the remainder of the essay, we will now further discuss an
important and very salient feature of modern globalization – i.e., inter-
national just-in-time production – to showcase first what this modern
aspect of globalization entails, and next how this might be changed
because of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and the economic aftermath,
thereby underpinning our more general argument that, in all likelihood,
the international economy will structurally start to attach more weight to
the role of borders and buffers.
3. What is at stake? Just-in-time production as the hallmark of
modern globalization
Just-in-time delivery is or, more accurately perhaps, was one of the
features of modern-day globalization. Spurred by technological changes
such automation and robotization, the just-in-time production of inter-
mediate products on the assembly lines across the globe has enabled
businesses to manage, or rather minimize, stocks optimally. Also, ad-
vances in multi-mode transportation have made it possible to manage
production processes in such a way that the need to keep large and
expensive stockpiles was substantially reduced, if not no longer necessary
altogether, prior to the COVID-19 crisis. As a consequence, global supply
chains have become “mean and lean”, as well as reliable in ways that
allowed production processes to become highly efficient: By and large,
only bones were left, with all flesh cut out. One of the technological
advances that has made this possible is the ICT revolution, which further
enabled vertical specialization on a global scale.
Richard Baldwin (2016) has dubbed this well-known development
the ‘second unbundling’ of the international economy. With this label,
vertical specialization or the fragmentation of the production process is
differentiated from the first unbundling: The geographical separation of
consumption and production that already started in the 19th century.
The latter, stimulated by the transport revolution of the 19th century,
was responsible for the first wave of modern globalization. The4
‘lean-and-mean’ efficiency gains of this second unbundling phase are
substantial. The benefits of the modern and truly global division of labor
no longer only work at a sector level, but also within production pro-
cesses – that is, within enterprises themselves. This implies a “Ricardo
squared” advancement of globalization, with the fundamental mecha-
nism of comparative advantage working at a much more fine-grained
disaggregated level – that is, not so much at the level of jobs, but at
that of specific tasks (a vivid description of this second unbundling is
given by Baldwin (2019)).
A key issue stressed by Baldwin (2019) is that not only goods and
intermediate products are traded globally, but also that, from roughly
1990s onwards, the ICT revolution made international flows of knowl-
edge possible on a new and much larger scale. The consequence is that
emerging countries have not followed a development path similar to that
of the classic industrial countries in the late 19th and early 20th century –
that is, by developing a sector from scratch, as once Japan did with the
automobile sector. Rather, specialization could take place in just a frag-
ment of the production process. In addition, the international flows of
knowledge changed the privileged or shielded position of American,
European and Japanese workers. For a long time, these workers had
exclusive access to the knowledge in the advanced industrial countries.
The massive increase of the international flows of knowledge changed
this.
Not only were parts of the production process relocated from indus-
trial to emerging countries, but the knowledge that made these firms
productive was relocated as well. The American, European, and Japanese
firms were teaching foreign workers not only how to become more
productive, but also offered them access to advanced knowledge in the
new factories – knowledge that could be easily transferred because of the
ICT revolution. The close tie between capital and labor in the advanced
economies was cut by the ICT revolution, and labor in advanced econ-
omies could be substituted by labor in emerging markets. The potentially
lower productivity in emerging markets could thus be compensated for
by lower labor cost. Besides the (huge) benefits of the now global division
of labor, this process had adverse consequences in the advanced econo-
mies in the form of a rapid de-industrialization at an unprecedented scale
(Baldwin, 2019). This process is further magnified by domestic techno-
logical progress that also makes certain jobs obsolete.
The competition from emerging markets no longer took place in the
form of the re-location of sectors, such as the textile industry of the 1970s,
but on a much finer-grained scale. Occupations were disappearing na-
tionally and relocating internationally within the production process.
Offshoring is more easily possible than it used to be, affecting fragments
within the production process instead of sectors as a whole. As a result, the
labor market underwent a remarkable and radical change, which is known
as so-called labor market polarization (Autor & Dorn, 2013; Goos et al.,
2009). The labor market is hollowed out, and capital rules the world
(albeit not in the way Marx had predicted). Employment in
medium-skilled (manufacturing) jobs declined relative to low-skilled and
high-skilled jobs. If the relative growth of employment categories is plotted
against skill levels, we observe a U-shaped pattern. In their seminal study,
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) document that the import penetration
fromChina in the US has had significant negative effects on employment in
parts of the US labor market. In a meta-study on the labor market effects of
offshoring and technological progress, Terzidis, Brakman, and
Ortega-Argiles (2019) find that, using a sample of 90 studies and 1283
estimates, both technology and offshoring are important for labor market
developments. However, the overall effect is conditional on a number of
moderating contingencies. For one, skill level is important since automa-
tion, on the one hand, is more likely to displace low-skilled employment
than offshoring is. Offshoring, on the other hand, is more likely to benefit
high-skilled workers. In addition, geography matters. Technology’s effect
is less likely to be positive in the US than trade effects, and trade by itself
has adverse effects in local labor markets.
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As Baldwin (2019) points out, the impact of this new ICT-driven
globalization that came about after 1990 is less straightforward than
the effect of the old globalization, which affected whole industries rather
than only small fragments in the production process. The meta-analysis
carried out by Terzidis, Brakman, and Ortega-Argiles (2019) reveals
that the effects of technology and offshoring are difficult to predict, as the
effects are strongly context-specific, and may interact subtly. It is difficult
to predict what stage in the production process can be offshored or
substituted by, for example, a robot. And importantly, it is difficult to
predict what the effects will be, because these effects are “more indi-
vidual, more sudden, more uncontrollable, and more unpredictable”
(Baldwin, 2019, p. 66).
Long supply chains also affect economies in other ways, which are
especially relevant for the consequences of system-wide or even global
shocks like the COVID-19 crisis. The longer the supply chain, the longer it,
for instance, took to recover from the financial crisis that led to the great
trade collapse of 2008/9. Brakman and van Marrewijk (2019) study the
resilience of countries after trade collapses. The main conclusion of their
analysis is straightforward: A strong involvement in global supply chains
raises the size of the decline, and slows down the recovery of countries
following a recession. Consistent with Altomonte, di Mauro, Ottaviano,
Rungi, and Vicard (2012), these results point to a slow (er) adjustment of
production to new expected levels of demand, which could indicate a
stronger influence of risk aversion at the macro level. So, the susceptibility
of countries that are heavily involved in global supply chains is likely to
also bemore affected this COVID-19 time around, which is underscored by
Fig. 1 at the beginning of our essay, giving an indication of how a
COVID-19 induced economic crisis and subsequent trade collapse evolve
quickly after the launch of national and global lockdown measures.
Crucially, as we argued above, what sets the COVID-19 crisis apart
from previous global economic shocks is that the risk perception asso-
ciated with global value chains is about to change, or has changed
already. The supply of medical supplies is, for instance, heavily depen-
dent on China, as PIIE (2020) indicates. But the lockdown that was
introduced in many countries was felt everywhere. The insecure de-
liveries, if any, of intermediate supplies affected industries everywhere,
and suddenly not having access to or control over the production of
medical supplies became a huge risk factor for countries and firms. This is
just one obvious example. But more generally, countries, firms and also
consumers learned almost overnight in February–March 2020 what the
implications are if global value chains break down and if theFig. 2. Traditional trade networks in the textile industry
Source: WTO Global Value Chain Development Report 2019, p. 29. The volume of the
The circles represent the relative magnitude of value-added exports.
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international trade of intermediate products comes to a halt. Suddenly,
just-in-time production and management went from very efficient and
low risk to very costly and high risk. As we argued above, we predict that
this increased risk awareness is here to stay, and that this will thereby
change the face of modern globalization.
It can thus be expected that across enterprises and economies a re-
evaluation will take place of risk appetite and the fundamental uncer-
tainty associated with pandemic outbreaks. After the financial crisis of
2008/9, the financial sector has re-evaluated its risk exposure. The
consequence was that banks were forced to substantially re-capitalize
themselves in order to become more resilient than before. Now, in the
aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, this most likely will also take place in
the economy in general, across many industries, sectors, and value
chains. Spurred by national governments and financial markets alike,
firms will try to reduce their dependency on only a few (and far-away)
global suppliers, triggering a trend toward geographical diversification
and – hence – de-globalization in the form of increased regionalization.
We take the textile industry as an example. Fig. 2 illustrates the
increased dependency within the textile industry between 2000 and
2017. What is immediately apparent from Fig. 2, is the increasing
importance of China in this sector. Indeed, this increased dependency on
China also holds for more technological advanced sectors, such as the
electronics sector, the optics sector, micro-chips factories that produce
flash memory cards, et cetera. This no doubt has increased cost re-
ductions, but also increased dependencies: Very much a just-in-time
world, and not so much a just-in-case one. Indeed, Fig. 2 visualizes
why China is often referred to as the ‘factory of the world ‘. Keeping this
in mind, how could COVID-19 lead to a structural change of modern-day
globalization?
In a world without frictions along the supply chain, the comparative
advantage of China in textile production (low cost and large scale) are
driving by the hub position of China and its textile firms. The right-hand
side panel of Fig. 2 is then indicative of a very efficient international
distribution of production. Risks of production or transport lines
breaking down are deemed very low or non-existent. But this apparently
highly efficient outcome might look very different if rare but very high-
risk events like the COVID-19 shock are starting to get priced. Suddenly,
the trade network depicted by the right-hand side panel looks rather
vulnerable. And if the costs of such a shock that might with a certain low
but still positive probability hit the value chain is discounted to the
present, textile firms will probably think twice about the efficiency of this
prime example of just-in-time production.
In the short term, becoming less dependent on a single production
hub for a global sector like the textile sector could (seemingly) increasevalue-added flow between trade partners is indicated by the thickness of the line.
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lasting disruptive shocks. In that sense, it could be a very efficient move
from the perspective of future costs. For global trade, the effect of a shock
like COVID-19 will be that firms will try to lower risk and to increase
their resilience by diversifying their supply chains, also by geographically
shortening their supply chain, making them more regional or even na-
tional instead. As opposed to being wholly dependent on a single efficient
supplier in China, they might opt for additional suppliers closer to home
in, say, Europe or the US. This is the border effect, as introduced above,
implying that COVID-19 could give rise to a changed risk assessment by
firms that engage in international trade in vulnerable value chains. This
implies a return to the “old-fashioned” multiple hub-spoke system of
international trade such as the one depicted in the left-hand side panel of
Fig. 2.
In addition, and irrespective of the precise configuration of a trade
network for a particular sector, the increased uncertainty associated with
international trade following (the perception of) an increased likelihood
of global shocks like COVID-19 will stimulate all firms to be less reliant
on global production chains and intermediate deliveries by keeping
larger stocks or buffers themselves, on or nearby their production loca-
tion. In the pre-corona lean-and-mean economy, increased “slack” was
seen as sign of inefficiency and poor management; but in the post-corona
times, buffers are likely to be regarded as a sign of a prudent and very
wise strategy. Again, as in the case of the geographical diversification of
deliveries, this implies a comeback of a “classic” strategy: keeping stocks
to buffer against disruption of production processes. Then, just-in-time
management is replaced by just-in-case management (cf. Alfasi & Por-
tugali, 2004). ‘Just-in-case’ management implies the return of buffers,
just like geographical diversification involves the comeback of borders.
5. International Business
So, what may the above analysis, taking primarily an Economics and
Geography perspective, imply for IB’s future research agenda? A key two-
fold question is to what extent and how the future international economy
will change due to the current COVID-19 shock, and how that will impact
practices of enterprises that operate internationally. Would the current
pandemic be seen, post-crisis, as a one-off and unique event, then many
internationally operating enterprises will simply bounce back to their
pre-corona “normal” practices. In this essay, we argue that this is an
unlikely outcome of the worldwide COVID-19 outbreak, as many actors –
from firms and governments to consumers and NGOs – will now realize
that a shock like this is very likely to hit the world again, probably sooner
rather than later. Pandemic outbreaks are anything but rare, and seem to
emerge more frequently in current times of globalization. There are more
and more of us, the homo sapiens, who like to travel abroad, and we live
close to, if not together with, an increasing number of other species. New
bacteria or viruses may emerge somewhere, jumping andmutating across
species to the homo sapiens (and vice versa), to subsequently quickly
spread across the globe. Since the 1980s, we had hiv, sars, ebola, mers,
Mexican flu, COVID-19, and more. The next one is very likely to be
waiting around the corner, somewhere local. And this next one might be
equally contagious, and more deadly than the current corona mutant.
Consumers, firms, governments, and other actors recognizing this, will
structurally downgrade their risk appetite, and include the benefits (and
costs) of resilience in their decision-making. As a result, the modern
variant of just-in-time globalization will be replaced with just-in-case
partial de-globalization, triggering the comeback of borders (geograph-
ical diversification across supply chains) and buffers (substantial stocks6
close to production sites). In value chains considered vital for society,
governments may “force” this upon the value chain’s actors. Switzerland is
a case in point. Their Federal Office for National Economic Supply
(FONES) can intervene in markets in order to ‘plug’ the gaps in essential
supplies (see https://www.bwl.admin.ch/bwl/en/home.html). Interna-
tionally operating enterprises may well decide to adapt their strategies
“voluntarily”. From an IB perspective, this can be studied by examining the
likely positive relationship between this strategic change, on the one hand,
and both the industry’s societal vitality and the chain’s dependency on far-
away supplies, on the other hand.Declaration of competing interest
The authors state that there are no conflicts of interest, and that all
three contributed equally to this commentary.
References
Alfasi, N., & Portugali, J. (2004). Planning just-in-time versus planning just-in-case. Cities,
21(1), 29–39.
Autor, D. H., & Dorn, D. (2013). The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization
of the US labor market. The American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553–1597.
Altomonte, C., di Mauro, F., Ottaviano, G., Rungi, A., & Vicard, V. (2012). Global value
chains during the great trade collapse: A bullwhip effect?. In Working paper series No.
1412. Frankfurt am Mainz: European Central Bank.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). The China Syndrome: Local labor market
effects of import competition in the United States. The American Economic Review,
103(6), 2121–2168.
Baker, S. B., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., & Terry, S. J. (2020). COVID-induced economic
uncertainty. In NBER working paper No. 26983. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Baldwin, R. (2016). The Great Convergence: Information technology and the new
globalization. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Baldwin, R. (2019). The globotics upheaval. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baldwin, R., & di Mauro, B. (Eds.). (2020). Economics in the time of COVID-19. CEPR E-
book: https://voxeu.org/system/files/epublication/COVID-19.pdf.
Baldwin, R., & Evenett, S. (2020). COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why turning inward won’t
work. E-book: https://voxeu.org/content/covid-19-and-trade-policy-why-turning-
inward-won-t-work.
Brakman, S., & van Marrewijk, C. (2019). Heterogeneous country responses to the great
recession: The role of supply chains. Review of World Economics, 155, 677–705.
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., & van Marrewijk, C. (2015). Regional resilience across
Europe: On urbanisation and the initial impact of the great recession. Cambridge
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 8(2), 225–240.
Financial Times. (2020). From ‘just in time’ to ‘just in case. May 4th 2020 https://www.ft
.com/content/f4fa76d9-aa11-4ced-8329-6fc8c250bc45.
Fingleton, B., Garretsen, H., & Martin, R. (2012). Recessionary shocks and regional
employment: Evidence on the resilience of UK regions. Journal of Regional Science,
52(1), 109–133.
Garretsen, H., Stoker, J. I., Soudis, D., Martin, R., & Rentfrow, J. (2020). Urban
Psychology and British Cities: Do personality traits matter for resilience to
recessions? Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, 13(3), 290–307.
Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2009). Job polarization in Europe. The American
Economic Review, 99(2), 58–63.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of interest, employment and money. London:
Macmillan.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. Chelmsford, MA: Courier Corporation.
IMF. (2020). World economic outlook. Washington DC: IMF. April 2020.




Scheidel, W. (2017). The great leveler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Seric, A., & Winkler, D. (2020). COVID-19 could spur automation and reverse globalization to
some extent. VOX EU. April 28: https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-could-spur-auto
mation-and-reverse-globalisation-some-extent.
Terzidis, N., Brakman, S., & Ortega-Argiles, R. (2019). Labour markets, trade and
technological progress: A meta-study. In CESifo working paper series 7719. Munich:
CESifo Group.
van Witteloostuijn, A. (1990). Learning in economic theory: A taxonomy with an
application to expectations formation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(2),
183–207.
